Emory International Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 3

2015

The Benefits and Dangers of Proportionality Review in Israel's
High Court of Justice
Michael Kleinman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Michael Kleinman, The Benefits and Dangers of Proportionality Review in Israel's High Court of Justice, 29
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 589 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol29/iss3/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

1/22/2015 12:26 PM

THE BENEFITS AND DANGERS OF PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW IN ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
In the landmark case Beit Sourik Village Council vs. the Government of
Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ),
grappled with a highly charged question: should a state have to sacrifice its
own security to improve human rights?1 The Court answered in the affirmative
and held that certain sections of Israel’s controversial security fence could not
be built as planned.2 In these sections, the loss of human rights outweighed the
security benefit of placing the fence through certain villages.3 Scholars from
both sides of the political spectrum have voiced strong opinions about this
case,4 and many of these debates have centered on the determinative aspect of
the case: the court’s proportionality review.5 This Comment will not grapple
with politics, nor will it focus exclusively on the Beit Sourik case. Rather, it
will analyze this case and similar cases to argue about the theoretical
implications of proportionality review in HCJ decisions. Through an analysis
of these cases, this Comment will determine the best way that a court could
grapple with the issue of balancing security and the right to life and bodily
integrity against other human rights.
This Comment argues that the method of proportionality analysis
implemented in earlier HCJ decisions should have been implemented in later
decisions where the Court balanced the property, dignity, and free movement
rights of West Bank Palestinians against the security, right to life, and bodily
integrity rights of Israeli citizens. In earlier cases, notably Horev v. The
Minister of Transportation, the Court evaluated and weighed the conflicting
1

HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 24 [2004], http://elyon1.court.gov.
il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf. The Court stated that as a general principle, the HCJ would
require the government to implement an alternate act, “whose [security] benefit will be somewhat smaller than
that of the former one,” if the alternate act “ensures a substantial reduction in the injury caused by the
administrative act.” Id.
2 Id. at 30–43.
3 Id.
4 Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and the Substantive Meanings of Proportionality in the Supreme
Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 38 ISR. L. REV. 262 (2005); Aeyal M. Gross, The
Construction of a Wall Between The Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and Limits of Humanitarian Law
and the Structure of Occupation, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 393, 395 (2006) (arguing for greater human rights); Jason
Litwack, A Disproportionate Ruling for all the Right Reasons, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 857 (2006) (arguing for
greater security).
5 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 263.
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rights in a systematic and consistent way before proceeding to balance those
rights against one another.6 This method ensured that the balancing was rooted
in legal precedent and rationality. However, in later decisions balancing the
right to life and bodily integrity against other rights, the Court demonstrated a
less disciplined approach where it balanced the conflicting rights without
determining the comparative value of those rights beforehand.7 This Comment
argues that in these later decisions, the Court should have more carefully
evaluated the relative value of the conflicting rights before proceeding to
balance them against each other.
Part I of this Comment presents a brief overview of proportionality review
and its benefits. Part II analyzes an earlier HCJ decision to show how it
demonstrates those benefits, and also how it employs proportionality in a way
that should have been employed in later decisions. Finally, Part III examines
later HCJ decisions that weigh the right to life and bodily integrity against
other human rights. It will critically examine the reasoning in these cases and
argue that the Court should have followed precedent and evaluated the relative
importance of the conflicting rights before beginning its proportionality
review.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PROPORTIONALITY
Proportionality review is a “widely diffused . . . [o]verarching principle of
constitutional adjudication” that courts worldwide use to balance conflicting
rights claims.8 Proportionality review comes into play when a government
limits an individual’s rights for a supposedly more important public right.9
Through this review, courts determine whether the government or legislative
body properly compared the benefit of the public good against the detriment to

6 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 211 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 153/83 Levi v.
Commissioner of the Israel Police Southern District 38(2) PD 393, 401−02 (“The variety of potential situations
necessitates a multi-shaded balancing approach. We must refrain from adopting a single standard for all
matters . . . conflicting interests are not always of identical normative import.”)), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/
files_eng/96/160/050/A01/96050160.a01.htm.
7 HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 443 [2004] (Isr.), http://www.dindayan.com/
rulings/02104970.r15.pdf.
8 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 73–74 (2008) (alteration in original).
9 See, e.g., Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No.1), App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
5 (1979) (balancing the right to a non-prejudiced trial through limitation on the freedom of press against the
freedom of press).

KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/22/2015 12:26 PM

ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

591

individual or group rights, and if not, it will rule the act unconstitutional.10 The
method has become so popular and widespread that it “has come to dominate
the dockets of constitutional and supreme courts around the world,”11 so much
so that theorists claim that a pervasive “balancing consciousness” has replaced
the question of whether to balance individuals rights against government action
with the sole question of how to balance properly.12
Israel has been recognized as a world leader in consistently employing
proportionality review in constitutional disputes. As early as 1992,13 Israel’s
HCJ has applied the principle of proportionality to hold that any government
action that limits human rights must be proportional to the detriment to human
rights; or, in other words, that “a decision of an administrative authority must
reach a reasonable balance between communal needs and the damage done to
the individual.”14 The HCJ’s version of the proportionality test breaks down
into three parts. First, the Court determines whether the action had a rational
connection to the government’s stated purpose (the “rational means test”).15
Next, the Court determines if the government employed the least restrictive
means possible to achieve the stated goal (the “least injurious means test”).16
Finally, the Court determines if there were alternative measures that would
have achieved a slightly diminished version of the goal while significantly
reducing damage to the other party’s rights.17 The Court has called this last test
the “proportionate means” test, or “proportionality in the narrow sense.”18 This

10 See Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 75–76 (“the analysis involves . . . judicial verification that,
with respect to the act in question, the means adopted by the government are rationally related to stated policy
objectives . . . [Next] the judge ensures that the measure does not curtail the right any more than is necessary
for the government to achieve its stated goals . . . The last stage, ‘balancing in the strict sense,’ is also known
as ‘proportionality in the narrow sense’ . . . In the balancing phase, the judge weighs the benefits of the act—
which has already been determined to have been ‘narrowly tailored,’ in American parlance—against the costs
incurred by infringement of the right, in order to determine which ‘constitutional value’ shall prevail, in light
of the respective importance of the values in tension, given the facts.” (alteration in original)).
11 Id. at 74.
12 Iddo Porat, The Dual Mode of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2006). See also Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 76 (2008) (“In
many polities today, proportionality is treated as a taken-for-granted feature of constitutionalism, or a criterion
for the perfection of the ‘rule of law.’”).
13 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel 1, 23 [2004] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 987/94
Euronet Golden Lines [1992]), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf.
14 Id. at 34.
15 Id. at 24.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 1, 25 [2004] (alteration in
original).
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last test represents the upper limit of judicial activism in constitutional law in
the world.19 The Court recognizes a legitimate governmental goal that could
not have been performed with any less damage, yet the Court may require a
different action to increase the rights of the damaged party.20
Israel is not the only nation that employs proportionality review that
includes the third narrow proportionality test.21 Proportionality review has
“spread like wildfire” to become a powerful and influential constitutional
doctrine worldwide.22 One scholar described proportionality as “the central
standard today for judicial decisions dealing with competing values and
interests in the public law of many democratic states.”23 Yet, scholars have
recognized the State of Israel as a worldwide leader of proportionality review
in constitutional issues;24 one scholar argues that the Israeli Supreme Court
applies proportionality “more consistently and rigorously than any other
judicial body in the world.”25
Despite the virtues of proportionality review in general,26 some scholars,
such as Moshe Cohen-Eliya, have argued that the HCJ sometimes oversteps its
bounds and applies the test in inappropriate ways, especially in regards to the
third test.27 According to Cohen-Eliya, the third proportionality test may
present a “lack of democratic legitimacy in the granting of sweeping powers to
judges to weigh the balance between societal goals and individual rights.”28
Rhis sort of balancing properly belongs with a democratically elected
government, he argues, and not with democratically unaccountable judges.29

19

Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 79. (“[S]o many new courts, operating in environments
traditionally hostile to judicial review, have so quickly and successfully embraced what is, inarguably, the
most intrusive form of review found anywhere.”).
20 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel PD 24 [2004]
21 Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 74−75.
22 Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Justification, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 458, 461
(2014).
23 Moshe Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 264.
24 Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 132.
25 Id.
26 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 459, 462.
27 Moshe Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 265.
28 Id.
29 Id.

KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/22/2015 12:26 PM

ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

593

A. Positive Aspects of Proportionality
Despite the dangers of proportionality, the doctrine, when properly used,
offers substantial benefits to democratic societies.30 In Israel and abroad, these
benefits have included an expanded array of protected rights, which results in a
diffusion of political strife as less popular rights nevertheless draw judicial
protection. Proportionality review also creates a constitutional culture that
holds government accountable for theoretically any limitation on rights. This
culture thereby prevents government institutions from deflecting judicial
scrutiny by hiding within “legal black holes,” or limitations on rights held as
“off limits” from judicial scrutiny. Finally, proportionality review allows for a
second look from judges, wherein legally trained eyes can critique and
improve on the way that the executive or legislative branch chose to limit some
rights for the sake of others.
1. Expanded Array of Rights
Proportionality review allows judges to reconsider the balancing of rights
that elected officials perform even when those officials stayed “in bounds” and
did not breach a fundamental right.31 For instance, in Horev v. Minister of
Transportation, the government allowed restrictions on a fundamental right—
freedom of movement—for the sake of protecting religious feelings (not
freedom of worship), an admittedly non-fundamental right.32
Proportionality review grows naturally out of an expanded set of
constitutionally protected rights.33 According to Cohen-Eliya and Porat, “the
broader the conception of rights becomes, the greater the likelihood that these
rights will at some point conflict with other rights or interests; therefore there
will be a need to balance the rights . . . in order to arrive at the most reasonable
solution.”34 Thus, proportionality review allows judges to double-check the
balancing already performed by officials in a theoretically limitless array of
situations, not just those that involve the most fundamental rights. For instance,
30

Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 461−62.
See e.g., HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’Am Company v. Minister of the Interior 2 [1953] (Isr.), http://www.
dindayan.com/rulings/53000730.z01.pdf; HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Southern District Police Commander [1984]
(Isr.), http://www.dindayan.com/rulings/83001530.z01.pdf (conflict between freedom of expression and
preserving public peace).
32 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 246–47 [1997] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.
il/files_eng/96/160/050/A01/96050160.a01.htm.
33 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 481.
34 Id. (alteration in original).
31
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the German Constitutional Court, one of the forerunners of proportionality
analysis, considered riding horses in forested areas, feeding pigeons, smoking
marijuana, and obtaining the permission to import certain breeds of dogs, as
interests that should be protected as constitutional rights.35 Thus,
proportionality review expands the rights that a national court will protect by
affording protection for rights beyond strictly “fundamental rights.”
By contrast, in the American constitutional system, one of the few
jurisdictions that still does not fully use proportionality review,36 Supreme
Court justices will only consider government infringement on rights preserved
in the Bill of Rights or in Supreme Court jurisprudence that defines a given
right as fundamental.37 American constitutional culture declares that
government officials have the publicly granted right and authority to limit nonfundamental rights; non-democratically elected judges have no power to
second guess government decisions that steer clear of fundamental rights.38 If
the American Supreme Court would choose to expand protected rights beyond
only those “fundamental rights,” its analysis of upcoming cases could look
different. In upcoming cases, the Court will analyze the issue of forcing
objecting business owners to purchase insurance for contraception devices
against their religious convictions.39 These cases may turn on whether forcing
such insurance coverage is actually a violation of freedom of religion or
another fundamental right. However, if the Court would employ a
proportionality scheme that expands protected rights beyond strictly
35

Id. at 478−79.
Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 74.
37 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (holding that right to privacy in
marriage is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution).
38 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra at 22, at 476 n.45, 479 (2011) (“A culture of authority implies a political
division of labor: the existence of distinct institutions for distinct spheres of public life, each best equipped to
act in its sphere, and accountable for its actions within that sphere.”). See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009)
(describing the U.S. governmental system as one “whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of
powers”); see also Secretary of State v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47 ¶ 62 (“[I]n matters of national security, the
cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to
respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special
information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the
community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the
community through the democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions,
they must be made by persons whom the people have elected and whom they can remove.”).
39 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the ‘contraception mandate’ threaten religious liberty,
WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/exemptions-from-the-contraceptionmandate-threaten-religious-liberty/2014/01/15/f5cb9bd0-7d79-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html.
36
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fundamental rights, then answering the question of whether forcing this
insurance coverage breaches a fundamental right would not prevent the case
from moving forward.
2. A Second Look at Controversial Decisions
Even when the American government tampers with a fundamental right,
the Supreme Court’s greatest check on government power involves strict
scrutiny, which requires that the ends are narrowly tailored to the means.40
This compares to the “least restrictive means test”41 in proportionality: did the
government achieve its compelling goal in a way that restricted rights in the
least possible way?42 However, the American Supreme Court will not consider
reducing that compelling goal if harm to rights can be further reduced.43
This reluctance to reduce the government’s goal—in essence, this
reluctance to correct the government on how it chooses to balance different
rights and values—stems from the American “culture of authority,” where the
Court authorizes narrowly tailored policy decisions on the theory that the
American populace authorized their officials to make that balance.44 In a
culture of authority, non-elected judges do not have the authority to reconsider
balances between rights, and so they do not tamper with those who had the
authority to make this balance.45 On the other hand, in nations that employ
proportionality review, the Court has the freedom to re-evaluate controversial
decisions of the executive or legislature to determine whether the government
reached such decisions through rational deliberation or political coercion.

40

See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997).
See, e.g., id. at 529.
42 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–43 (2003) (holding that considering race in school
admissions passes the least restrictive means tests where the purpose is to achieve student body diversity,
which is a compelling state interest).
43 But see Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“[The Court] has examined the restrictions’ proportionality, the relation between restriction and objective, the
fit between ends and means.”).
44 Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, supra note 22, at 475. But see HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of
Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 207 [1997] (Isr.) (“[A] democratic system prioritizes human rights above all
else. Democracy is not merely formal democracy—the ‘rule book conception,’ according to which decisions
are left to majority will. Rather, democracy is substantive—the ‘rights conception,’ according to which the
majority is precluded from infringing on human rights.”).
45 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 479.
41
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3. Diffusing Political Strife
By expanding the set of protected rights, proportionality review also helps
diffuse national political strife. A constitutional court may be drawn to usurp
certain “foreign” rights for the sake of other more homegrown rights based on
text, tradition, and the authority of democratically elected officials.46 When
certain values categorically trump others, the losing party feels unrepresented
and perhaps disrespected.47 By requiring a balance of all values and rights,
proportionality review prevents certain more culturally entrenched rights from
swallowing newer, imported rights and needs.48 Proportionality review thereby
diffuses politically charged conflicts by examining the facts and circumstances
of every case where rights have been limited and avoids “rhetorical
exaggeration” of which right a society cherishes more.49
In a related way, proportionality review diffuses political strife by
transforming a debate about values into a rational trade-off between factual
issues.50 For example, the Sunday Times Case, heard in the European Court of
Human Rights, balanced the right of the government to prevent the publication
of information that would prejudice an ongoing lawsuit with the principle of
freedom of expression and the public’s right to access important information
(the case concerned a deadly drug that caused deformed births in much of the
British population).51 In its review, the Court refused to determine the case
based solely on which value was more important. Instead, the Court looked at
the facts of the case: on the one hand, the potentially prejudiced case was
essentially finished and in a “legal cocoon;”52 on the other hand, the facts of
the case at issue involved a “disaster”53 and a “matter of undisputed public
concern.”54 Thus, the Court ruled that, based on proportional standards, the
46

See id.
See id. at 466, 472.
48 See id. at 469–70; HCJ 5016/ 96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 207 [1997] (Isr.)
(“[T]he stricter the separation between religion and state under a given system, and the more that the rights are
set out in more ‘absolute’ terms, the more likely that such a system will prefer human rights to human feelings.
Conversely, the more permeable the boundaries between religion and state, and the more a legal culture is
predicated on a ‘relative’ conception of human rights, the greater significance it will attach to feelings as a
proper ground for limiting human rights.”).
49 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 470.
50 Id. at 466.
51 Case of the Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No.1), App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 34 (1979).
52 Id. ¶ 31.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 6.
47
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British government must allow publication about the facts of the case, not
solely because freedom of speech was fundamentally more valuable than the
values of a fair trial, but because factually there was a much greater public
benefit achieved by allowing the information to be published compared to the
small detriment of releasing information about a defunct case.55 Through this
ruling, the Court helped diffuse any political strife in British society between
free speech values and the values of a fair trial. Instead, the Court
deconstructed the issue into its basic components and allowed for the dispute
to be resolved through a factual assessment.56
4. Legal Black Holes
Nations that do not use proportionality review tend to authorize
infringements on rights based on technical discussions of standing and
separation of powers.57 The United States has denied protections based on
these technical situations.58 Former HCJ Chief Justice Aharon Baraak
describes this legal practice as creating “black holes” in the law.59 A court
practicing proportionality review largely fills in these black holes.60 For
instance, Justice Barak stated in a more recent case that the HCJ “does not
55

Id. ¶ 67.
See Case of the Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No.1), App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) ¶ 65 (1979).
57 See generally Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
58 See generally Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). On the
question of whether certain foreign nationals had a constitutional right to retrial after being denied rights to
access their foreign consul, the Court held that such rights were not guaranteed because only a presidential
memorandum demanded such a retrial, and “the President’s Memorandum [does not] constitute directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions.” Because
of an arguably technical aspect of the separation of powers, the Court was comfortable denying these foreign
nationals a basic right of customary international law, memorialized by the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. Id.
59 AHARON BARAK, A JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 194 (2006). See also Eileen Kaufman, Deference or
Abdication: A Comparison of the Supreme Courts of Israel and the United States in Cases Involving Real or
Perceived Threats to National Security, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 95, 96 (2013) (“The Israeli
Supreme Court summarily rejects the political question doctrine and treats challenges to the legality of military
conduct as justiciable, whereas the United States Supreme Court typically declines to hear cases involving
ongoing military actions. Additionally, the Israeli Supreme Court rarely utilizes a state secrets privilege,
whereas the United States Supreme Court embraces the doctrine, which often immunizes illegal governmental
action.”); John P. Blanc, A Total Eclipse of Human Rights—Illustrated by Mohamed v. Jepesen Dataplan, Inc.,
114 W. VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2012) (“[T]he federal judiciary has allowed human rights to be eclipsed by
the national security interests pursued by the Executive Branch. . . . In giving excessive deference to the
Executive Branch’s claims of privilege under the judicially-created ‘state secrets doctrine,’ the federal
judiciary has undertaken a ‘complete abandonment of judicial control . . . lead[ing] to intolerable abuses.’)
(quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953)).
60 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 477.
56
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refrain from judicial review merely because the military commander[’s] . . .
actions have political and military ramifications.”61 A great number of HCJ
decisions have unswervingly followed this approach.62 Cohen-Eliya and Porat
attribute the HCJ’s tenacity in reviewing even the most controversial issues
and policies of Israeli national security under the judicial microscope to
Israel’s culture of proportionality review.63
Such constitutional culture stands in contrast to judicial attitudes in the
United States. For instance, in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, a dual U.S.-Yemenese
citizen was placed on a targeted killing “kill list” allegedly authorized by the
United States and its Central Intelligence Agency, despite that he had been
charged with no crime and was only suspected of conspiring with the terrorist
group Al Quaeda.64 The plaintiffs brought the charge against the U.S.
Government, but the District Court for the District of Columbia declined to
hear the case on the grounds that “any judicial determination as to the propriety
of a military attack on Anwar Al-Aulaqi would “require this court to elucidate
the . . . standards that are to guide a President when he evaluates the veracity of

61

HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477 1, 23 (2005).
Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished Deference to the
Military: Lessons from Israel, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 921 (2010) (noting a “dramatic decline in the
deference accorded to the military commander by the Supreme Court.”).
63 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 33, at 470. See also Eur. Consult. Ass., Guidelines of the Comm. of
Ministers of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, 804th Meeting 8–9
(2002) (“All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect human rights and the principle of the rule
of law, while excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or racist treatment, and must
be subject to appropriate supervision. . . . When a measure restricts human rights, restrictions must be defined
as precisely as possible and be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued. . . . Within the context of the
fight against terrorism, the collection and the processing of personal data by any competent authority in the
field of State security may interfere with the respect for private life only if such collection and processing, in
particular: (i) are governed by appropriate provisions of domestic law; (ii) are proportionate to the aim for
which the collection and the processing were foreseen; (iii) may be subject to supervision by an external
independent authority. . . . Measures used in the fight against terrorism that interfere with privacy (in particular
body searches, house searches, bugging, telephone tapping, surveillance of correspondence and use of
undercover agents) must be provided for by law. It must be possible to challenge the lawfulness of these
measures before a court. Measures taken to fight terrorism must be planned and controlled by the authorities so
as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force and, within this framework, the use of
arms by the security forces must be strictly proportionate to the aim of protecting persons against unlawful
violence or to the necessity of carrying out a lawful arrest.”); McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R.48 (1995) (“[T]he Court must carefully scrutinise, as noted above, not only
whether the force used by the soldiers was strictly proportionate to the aim of protecting persons against
unlawful violence but also whether the anti-terrorist operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so
as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force.”).
64 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4, 6 (D.D.C. 2010).
62
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military intelligence,” an undertaking forbidden by the American “political
question doctrine.”65
Thus, the benefits offered by proportionality review include expanding the
array of constitutional rights; increasing sensitivity to minority values by
reframing issues as factual disputes, thereby avoiding alienating minority
values; and filling in legal “black holes.”66
II. HOREV
The HCJ’s decision in Horev illustrates these benefits of proportionality
review.67 In Horev, the HCJ examined the constitutionality of a government
ban on driving through a religious neighborhood on the Sabbath.68 The traffic
municipality instituted this ban because commuters greatly offended the
religious feelings of the neighborhood dwellers.69 This ban only added a twominute detour to travel time for commuters, besides those living on Bar Ilan
street.70 Nevertheless, the issue sparked “bitter debate” between religious and
secular Israelis and aggravated “deep-seated political disputes” about the
separation of religion and state in Israel.71 The Court held that the ban passed
Constitutional muster and was proportional because the detriment of the twominute detour was minimal when compared to the great harm to religious
feelings that would result if the ban were lifted.72
The case presents a clear example of the ways in which proportionality
review can expand the array of rights that a court will consider, thereby
diffusing political strife by including and giving voice to minority or fringe
values.

65

Id. at 70 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
See also Stephanie Blum, Preventative Detention in the War on Terror: A Comparison of How the United
States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, 4 HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS 3
(2008) (“[B]oth Israel and Britain have almost always had an explicit role for judicial review before subjecting
the suspect to prolonged preventive incapacitation whereas President Bush has asserted that the executive
branch can alone resolve factual disputes and determine whether an individual is an enemy combatant based
on intelligence reports without any opportunity for the detainee to respond.”).
66 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 477.
67 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 214 [1997] (Isr.).
68 Id. at 165.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 172.
71 Id. at 161.
72 Id. at 246.
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A. Expanded Rights and Diffusing Political Strife
First, the Court held that a broad array of rights earned protection under
HCJ scrutiny, even rights not formally enshrined in the Basic Laws (Israel’s
equivalent of a Bill of Rights).73 According to Chief Justice Barak “whether
the violation relates to rights ‘covered’ by the two Basic Laws or not is equally
irrelevant.”74 This statement demonstrates the HCJ’s default approach of
expanding the array of constitutionally protected rights beyond those explicitly
mentioned in text.75 The Court takes the position that it must protect all values
of the State of Israel, a “Jewish and democratic state.”76 This position flows
from the text of the Basic Laws, which states that its purpose “is to protect
human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of
the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.”77 The Court reads this
clause as permission to scrutinize any legislation or order that conflicts with a
broad set of values. As mentioned, by expanding the set of protected values,
the Court invites proportionality review, as “[t]he broader the conception of
rights becomes, the greater the likelihood that these rights will at some point
conflict with other rights or interests; therefore there will be a need to balance
the rights and interests involved in order to arrive at the most reasonable
solution.”78
In the Court’s view, the Sabbath traffic did not restrict the worshippers’
freedom of religion but rather their religious feelings.79 The Basic Laws did not
specifically protect religious feelings.80 Nevertheless, the Court analyzed
73

HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 200 [1997] (Isr.).
Id. See also Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights? 7 (Jean Monet
Program, Working Paper No. 09/08, 2008) (“It should be noted that in the crudest balancer’s view, there
cannot be any concept of fundamental rights having priority over other considerations.”).
75 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 200 [1997] (Isr.) (“[I]t has always been our
position that legislation includes both general and specific purposes. The general purposes are the values of the
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; the specific purposes refer to the specific proper purpose
specified by the limitation clause).
76 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 5752–1992, 1391 LSI 150, § 10 (1992) (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
77 Id.
78 Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP. L.
463, 481 (2011).
79 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 218 [1997] (Isr.) (“[L]et it be
emphasized that I am not convinced that Sabbath traffic on Bar-Ilan Street infringes the freedom of religion of
the residents. These residents are free to observe the religious commandments. Sabbath traffic does not serve
to deny them this freedom.”).
80 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 5752–1992, 1391 LSI 150, § 10 (1992) (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
74
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whether religious feelings deserved protection as a Jewish and democratic
right. To preserve the peace and quiet of their day of rest, the respondents had
requested that traffic be blocked off completely from their street.81 The Court
analyzed their request by looking at the Sabbath in the context of Jewish
religion and history:
Deprive Judaism of the Sabbath, and you have deprived it of its soul,
for the Sabbath comprises the very essence of Judaism’s nature. Over
the generations, throughout its blood-soaked history, our nation has
sacrificed many [lives] in the name of the Sabbath.82

The Chief Judge is not a religious person,83 yet, he entered into the mindset of
religious people to understand and respect the protection that they requested.
He described the subjective experience of a religious Sabbath, placed the
Sabbath in the context of a national history and ethos, and even looked at the
issue through an ancient religious text,84 all to look through the lens of the
respondent and to respect their position. This move illustrates the Court’s
willingness to consider all rights and not to allow a majority view to
automatically trump minority values.
Next, the Court analyzed whether religious feelings deserved protection as
a democratic right. The Court reasoned that since it would restrict certain
fundamental rights to prevent physical harm—for instance, limiting the right to
protest85—then it would also protect religious feelings:
A democratic society, which is prepared to restrict rights in order to
prevent physical injury, must be equally sensitive to the potential
need for restricting rights in order to prevent emotional harm, which,
at times, may be even more severe than physical injury. A democratic

81

HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 165 [1997] (Isr.).
Id. at 201.
83 See Ilan Marciano, MK Ravitz: Barak made secularism a religion, YNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3303877,00.html.
84 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 201 [1997] (Isr.). Later in the
opinion, the Court stated: “Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, described this special atmosphere as the additional
soul which man is granted upon the entrance of the Sabbath, which leaves him as it exits. Babylonian Talmud,
Tractate Beitza 16a, [110]. This rest is intended to bring the routine of daily life to a halt, and relieve man of
daily worries. . . . A crowded street that traverses the heart of the neighborhood, with the sounds of honking
and engines, stands in stark contrast to the Sabbath atmosphere, as the majority of the local residents
understand it.” Id. at 224. This analysis through the lens of a religious Judaism shows the Court’s sensitivity to
a broad range of values, even those not held by the Justices themselves.
85 HCJ 153/83 Alan Alevi and Yaheli Amit v. Southern Dist. Police Commander 38(2) PD 1, 1–2 [1984]
(Isr.).
82
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society seeking to protect life, physical integrity and property, must
also strive to protect feelings.86

The Court also noted that protecting this right was in the “public interest in
preserving the public peace and public order.”87
Thus, the Court determined that the religious feelings of the respondents
deserved protection as a Jewish and democratic rights, despite the fact that
such feelings were not specifically enshrined in the Basic Laws.88 Such
analysis helped to “[lower] the stakes of politics” and avoided favoring certain
rights over others in a categorical fashion.89 The Court recognized a need to
protect a right, even if that right was not important to a clear majority of the
population, or a fundamental right protected by the Basic laws, and thereby
prevented a majority rule from swallowing up minority rights.90
B. Systematic Approach and Pre-Balance Weighing of the Rights
Having determined that religious feelings deserved protection, the Court
turned next to balancing those feelings against the petitioner’s freedom of
movement.91 The Court’s approach to this balancing act demonstrates a
consistent and systematic method and models what proportionality review can
achieve. Most notably, the Court engages in a systematic comparison of the
conflicting rights before attempting to balance them against one another.92 This
difference in analytical approach before balancing stands in contrast to the
approach in Beit Sourik and similar cases, where virtually no discussion of the
relative value of rights occurred before the balancing process.93

86

HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 203 [1997] (Isr.).
Id. at 220.
88 See id. at 206, 207; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a
constitutionally protected right to privacy despite its absence from the Bill of Rights).
89 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 466 (alteration in original).
90 But see HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 203–04 [1997] (Isr.) (“Democracy is
not merely formal democracy—the ‘rule book conception,’ according to which decisions are left to majority
will. Rather, democracy is substantive—the ‘rights conception,’ according to which the majority is precluded
from infringing on human rights.”).
91 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 209 [1997] (Isr.).
92 Id. at 209–12.
93 See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov. Isr. 58(5) PD 1, 24 [2004] (Isr.). Paragraphs 51
through 81 layout a detailed proportionality analysis weighing the security benefits of different sections of
Israel’s security fence against the detriment to human rights in each of those sections. Id. at 31–43. Neither in
these paragraphs nor anywhere else in the opinion where in the opinion does the Court engage in a pre-balance
evaluation of the relative importance of those rights.
87
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In this case, the Court recognized the need to assess the relative importance
of the rights before balancing them so that the weighing process could be
rational.94 The Court’s decision to proceed in this manner bears explanation.
The Court assessed the relative social importance of the different values
before weighing them because different principles and freedoms carry different
weight in society. Because the Court was “balancing between conflicting
interests and values”95 and “placing competing values on the scale”96 and
weighing them, it had to assess the relative weight of the rights in question
before balancing them. As the Court stated, “balance on the basis of weight
necessarily implies a social assessment of the relative importance of the
different principles” before the balancing process.97
For instance, if the value of protecting religious feelings was not so
important in the first place, then a significant amount of hurt feelings would
not necessarily justify a moderate restriction on the right to free movement.
Conversely, if religious feelings were important, then perhaps protecting a
moderate degree of hurt feelings would justify a moderate restriction on
freedom of movement. Interestingly, this procedure retreats somewhat from the
benefit mentioned earlier, that of avoiding political strife by avoiding ranking
certain rights over others.98 On the other hand, it appears to be a necessary
move for courts employing proportionality review, in order to ensure that the
process is rational and represents a fair trade-off between benefits and
detriments.99
The Court would not only have to assess the importance of rights before a
proportionality review; the Court would also have to assess these rights relative
to one another.100 As the Court cited from an earlier case: “[a] social value,

94

HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 197–98 [1997] (Isr.) (“[T]he process of
placing competing values on the balancing scales . . . does not establish criterion or value weights to assist in
performing the interpretative task.”) (citing FH 9/77 Israel Electric Co. v. “Ha’aretz” Newspaper Publications
32(3) PD 337, 361 (Isr.)).
95 Id. at 193.
96 Id. “This was the Court’s approach regarding the conflict between freedom of expression and
preserving public peace” Id.
97 Id. at 198 (citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board 41(1) PD 421, 434 (Isr.)).
98 See Part I.A.iii.
99 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and the Substantive Meanings of Proportionality in the Supreme
Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 38 ISR. L. REV. 262, 267 (2005) (“[Proportionality] analysis is
in fact based on a calculation of [] the relative importance of the conflicting values and the impact of the
infringement on each of these values.”).
100 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 192 [1997] (Isr.).
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such as freedom of expression, does not have ‘absolute weight’.”101 The weight
of any social principle is relative. The status of any fundamental principle is
always assessed in relation to that of other principles with which it is likely to
conflict.102 Thus, the Court determined that a generalized standard for
balancing between religious feelings and freedom of movement would have to
be found.103 The Court would have to determine how to value religious
feelings as compared to the freedom of movement before beginning to balance
them against each other. This would provide the Court with three fundamental
benefits.
First, assessing the relative weights of these rights would provide guidance
when facing a similar case in the future.104 Second, this assessment would
allow the Court to formulate a “rational principle” that would guide its
balancing process.105 Deciding a certain trade-off between competing rights
and values gains more credibility when judges are realistic and open about the
relative importance of those values. Thus, for instance, speed limits aim at
protecting life, but they restrict the freedom of speeding on the highway. Any
proportionality review that would weigh the benefits of speed limits against the
detriment of restricting “speeding rights” would have to assess the relative
weight of life and speeding. As many scholars have noted, courts employing
proportionality review determine whether a rights-limiting action promotes a
given, axiomatic system of constitutional principles; therefore, these courts
must first determine the relative weights of the values in question to determine
where they fall within that system, to determine the best way to promote the
overall constitutional scheme of rights.106 Third, through this pre-balancing
assessment of the relative value of rights, the Court would proceed according
to a “substantive criteria, which is neither paternalistic nor accidental.”107 By
assessing, in a standardized and procedural way, the relative importance of
goals and rights before balancing, the Court assured that its decision would not
merely reflect personal conviction or taste but a fair and objective balance
101 Id. at 194 (citing CA 105/92 Reem Engineers and Contractors Ltd. V. Municipality of Upper Nazareth
47(5) IsrSC 189, 205 (Isr.)).
102 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 50–56 (Julian Rivers trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 2002). See also The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/paper2_en.asp (“The final decision on how much latitude is to
be given to national authorities depends on the weight the Court attaches to . . . the nature of the right[s]”).
103 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.).
104 Id. at 196.
105 Id.
106 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 470.
107 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 196 [1997] (Isr.).
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between competing claims, rooted in precedent determining the relative
importance of rights.
The following discussion of the Horev case will highlight how the Court
balanced the relative importance of the rights and goals at issue in a systematic
way based on reasoning and precedent.
C. Threshold of Tolerance
Before beginning to balance the different rights, the Court sought a limiting
principle to determine how much protection of religious feelings could limit
freedom of movement. When other more fundamental rights infringe on
protected feelings, the Court would not restrict those rights so that they
“eventually disappear.”108 Rather, the Court would only restrict more
fundamental rights for the sake of feelings when those feelings were hurt
beyond a “threshold of tolerance.”109 The Court cited older cases where it
balanced the protection of feelings against the freedom of speech to lay down
this “threshold of tolerance” test.110 This threshold represents the risk of hurt
feelings that democratic citizens accept in exchange for living in a free
culture.111
In other older cases, the Court dealt with “a horizontal clash between two
conflicting human rights” of equal value112 and therefore did not engage in a
preliminary determination of whether the rights could be balanced against each
other in the first place.113 But here, freedom of movement outweighed

108 Id. at 204 (“If we were to restrict freedom of expression each time that feelings were hurt, freedom of
expression would eventually disappear.”) (citing HCJ 953/89 Indoor v. Mayor of Jerusalem 45(4) PD 683, 690
(Isr.)).
109 Id. at 206.
110 Id. at 204, 205. See also HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Films and Plays Censorship Bd.,
43(2) PD 1, 21 [1989] (Isr.) (“It reflects, in my opinion, the conception that a democratic society, by its very
nature and content, is based on tolerance of others’ opinions. In a pluralistic society tolerance is the one power
allowing for shared existence. Thus, every member of the public takes upon himself the ‘risk’ of suffering
some offence to his feelings in the course of free exchange of opinions.”).
111 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 205 [1997] (Isr.).
112 Id. at 220.
113 HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Isr. 59(4) PD 27–28 [2005] (Isr.) (“In the case before
us, we are presented with a conflict between two basic rights of equal weight . . . both the freedom of worship
and the freedom of movement have been recognized in our case law as being on the highest level of the scale
of rights. . . . In addition, with regard to both of them an identical balancing formula has been applied in order
to balance them against the same public interests. . . . The result implied by the conclusion that we are
concerned with a conflict between two rights of equal weight is that the balance required in this case is a
horizontal balance, which will allow the coexistence of both of these rights.”).
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protection of feelings in general.114 The Court therefore would have to
determine whether the offense to feelings was severe enough even get on the
scale against another heavily weighted right.115
In this move, the Court showed that before it balances rights, it focuses on
the specific nature of those rights. The Court classified and ranked values to set
up the most rational balancing process. Not all rights would deserve equal
protection; rather, they would require more or less weight, depending on their
nature.116 According to the Court, the nature of protected feelings is that, in
general, their value does not even compare to more fundamental rights unless
there is breach of the “threshold of tolerance” described above.117 Only then
can there even be a discussion of a proportionality review between them.118
Thus, the greater weight of freedom of movement and the lesser weight of
protected feelings significantly influenced the Court’s proportionality review.
The Court did not determine the relative weight of these rights arbitrarily.
The Court derived the “threshold of tolerance” analysis from earlier cases
dealing with balancing feelings against free speech.119 Because free speech and
free movement held equal weight as fundamental rights, and because
protection of feelings required a threshold of tolerance to limit free speech in a
previous case, therefore in the present case, protection of feelings required a
threshold of tolerance to limit freedom of movement.120 The Court displayed
here a principled, almost quantitative method of analysis based on precedent.
All questions of balancing hurt feelings against the heaviest fundamental rights
would garner similar treatment under a consistently applied “threshold of
tolerance” analysis.
The Court further fleshed out this “threshold of tolerance” test and gave it
more nuance, holding that only “severe, serious, and grave offenses” to
feelings could justify a limitation on certain fundamental rights.121 By further
limiting the situations where hurt feelings could limit the freedom of

114

HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 192–93 [1997] (Isr.).
Id. at 193 (“[A] decision’s reasonableness is assessed by balancing between competing values,
according to their respective weight” but “there are some interests against which there can be no balancing”).
116 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 208 [1997] (Isr.).
117 Id. at 204, 206–07.
118 Id. at 206.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 208–09.
121 Id. at 209.
115
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movement, the Court further emphasized the great importance of freedom of
movement relative to religious feelings.
Again, the Court approached the discussion of the relative importance of
the rights in systematic fashion. The Court explained that the “threshold of
tolerance” analysis does not apply equally in all situations, but rather is “a
function of the right and infringement in question.”122 Justice Zamir stated in
Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel:
The threshold of tolerance for feelings, is neither set nor identical in
every situation. The threshold depends, inter alia, on the identity of
the conflicting right. For instance, the threshold may vary depending
on whether the right in question is a basic right, such as freedom of
expression, or a material, financial interest. Thus, while the threshold
can be quite high if protecting feelings requires infringing the freedom of expression, it may be lower regarding infringements on property.123

Thus, the threshold of tolerance for hurt feelings changes depending not only
on whether it is being balanced against a fundamental right, but also on the
level of importance of the fundamental right that has been limited to protect
such feelings.124
In Horev, the limited right was the right to freedom of movement. The
Court cited earlier cases demonstrating the importance of freedom of
movement as “a natural right, recognized as self-evident in every country
boasting a democratic regime,”125 that was “of equal value and weight” with
freedom of expression,126 both of which “may be called ‘superior’”127 and are
granted a “consecrated place of honor in the temple of basic human rights.”128
Because freedom of movement is “a freedom at the pinnacle of human rights in
Israel”129 and is such a basic, fundamental right compared to protection of
religious feelings, “only severe, serious, and grave offense to another’s feelings
can justify the infringement of a basic human right,” such as freedom of
122
123

Id. at 206.
Id. at 206–07 (citing HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Gov’t of Isr. 51(2) PD 509, 521 [1997]

(Isr.)).
124

Implicitly, to the HCJ, not all fundamental rights are of equal importance.
HCJ 111/53 Kaufman v. Minister of the Interior PD 534, 536 [1953] (Isr.).
126 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 209 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 448/85 Dahar v.
Minster of the Interior 40(2) PD 701, 708 [1986] (Isr.)).
127 Id. (citing 153/83 Levy v. S.D. Police Commander 38(2) PD 393, 398 [1984] (Isr.)).
128 Id. at 209–10.
129 Id. at 213.
125
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movement.130 Thus, by adding further nuance to the threshold of tolerance test,
the Court emphasized the great importance of freedom of movement relative to
protected feelings. Moreover, the Court used precedent to determine the
relative value of the rights, for instance, by comparing freedom of movement
with freedom of expression.
D. Scope, Depth, and Probability
The Court added even further nuances, including scope, depth, and
probability requirements, which further emphasized the relative importance of
freedom of movement to protected feelings. To deserve protection when very
high order fundamental rights are at issue, the affront to feelings must not only
be “severe, serious, and grave,” but it must reach an appropriate “scope and
depth.”131 The offense must hurt a sufficiently broad swath of the population,
not just extreme minority groups, and it must constitute a deep offense
immediately, not just minor irritations that spread out over many years become
severely offensive.132 Moreover, the occurrence of the offense must be
sufficiently probable in a given situation.133 The Court recounted different
probability standards for harms that would gain protection at the expense of
other more important rights, based on the “magnitude of the various conflicting
rights.”134 Justice Barak noted in an earlier case:
[W]hen adopting the standard of probability one should not follow a
general, universal criterion, since it depends on the force of the different values that come into conflict within a given legal context. . . .
The question always is whether the measure of harm, weighed
against the possibility that it may not actually occur, justifies violation of a civil right so as to prevent the danger.135

Thus, by piling on standards and hurdles limiting the ability of protected
feelings to infringe on freedom of movement, the Court emphasized the great
importance of freedom of movement relative to protected feelings.
130

Id. at 209.
Id. at 210 (citing HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Gov’t of Isr. 51(2) PD 509, 524–25 [1997]
(Isr.)) (“The severity of the offensiveness is measured on two levels: its scope and its depth. First, the harm
must be broad. It is therefore insufficient that one person or a small group with minority extreme opinions is
offended.”).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 211 (citing EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Comm. 39(2) PD 225 [1985] (Isr.));
CrimA 126/62 Dissenchick v. Attorney Gen. 17 PD 169, 311 [1953] (Isr.); id. at 211–12 [1997] (Isr.) (citing
448/85 Dahar v. Minster of the Interior 40(2) PD 701, 708 [1986] (Isr.)).
135 EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Comm. 39(2) PD 98 [1985] (Isr.).
131
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Again, the determination of the relative importance of the conflicting
values occurred systematically and according to Court precedent. The Court
noted that when balancing hurt feelings against freedom of expression136 and
freedom of worship and freedom of conscience,137 the Court required a “near
certainty” or “proximately certain” probability of harm.”138 Likewise, because
freedom of movement ranked equally with these other fundamental freedoms,
they could only be limited by a “nearly certain” or “proximately certain”
offense to religious feelings.139 Thus, legal precedent determined the relative
value of rights and the way unequal rights should enter the balancing equation.
In this case, there was not even a question of probability in determining
offense to religious feelings, as “absolute certainty” as to offense of religious
feelings “was unequivocally proven.”140
E. Summary
To summarize, the Court in Horev used multiple layers of tests and
precedent before it began a proportionality review that balanced offended
feelings against freedom of movement. These tests included a “threshold of
tolerance,” a magnitude requirement, and a “scope, depth and probability”
requirement. First, the court required that the offense to religious feelings
passed a “threshold of tolerance” before it would limit any other right: the
Court would only limit free movement rights for the sake of feelings if feelings
were hurt beyond the normal risk a citizen takes by living in a free culture of
conflicting ideas.141 Next, this breach against feelings had to be “severe,
serious, and grave” in order to limit more fundamental rights such as freedom
of movement and speech.142 Such fundamental rights were weighted equally
based on precedent, and they only get on the scale against “severe, serious, and
grave” offenses to feelings, again based on precedent. Finally, offenses to

136 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior 7(2) PD 24 [1953] 871; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 211 [1997] (Isr.)(citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film & Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD
[1987](Isr.)); HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Films & Plays Bd. 43(2) PD 26–27 [1989] (Isr.); HCJ
680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) PD 25 [1988] (Isr.).
137 Id. (citing HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Gov’t of Isr. 51(2) PD 509 [1997] (Isr.)); id. (citing
HCJ 2725/93 Salomon v. Jerusalem Dist. Commander of Police 49(5) PD 366 [1995] (Isr.)).
138 HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) PD 25 [1988] (Isr.); EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Comm. 39(2) PD 99 [1985] (Isr.); HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD
153, 211 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of the Interior 40(2) PD [1986](Isr.)).
139 Id.
140 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 227 [1997] (Isr.).
141 Id. at 209.
142 Id. at 210.
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feelings could only limit these high order fundamental rights if they have
enough “scope,” “depth,” and are “nearly certain” or “proximately certain” to
occur. The offense to feelings must pass through four hurdles before the Court
balances it against the highest fundamental rights.143
These multiple layers of “pre-proportionality tests” are all designed to
ensure that the Court determines the relative importance of the conflicting
rights and values before balancing them against each other. Again, this
determination is necessary, as a balance between rights must account for the
relative difference between types of rights, as well as aim at promoting an
overall scheme of Constitutional rights with certain rights ranked higher than
others.144 As the Horev case shows, the Court has the capacity to perform this
pre-balancing analysis of rights in a reasoned fashion based on court precedent.
F. The Holding
The Court determined that the infringement on the respondents’ religious
feelings were “severe, grave, and serious”145 and sufficiently probable.146 Thus
the first sub-test was satisfied, that of a rational connection. Next, the Court
analyzed whether the government employed the least restrictive means
available.147 The Court determined that the only way to limit freedom of
movement in least restrictive manner while preserving religious feelings was to
close Bar-Ilan street exclusively during prayer times, since the harm to
religious feelings caused by noisy street traffic is inflicted mainly during
prayer times.148 To close the street for any more time would overly burden the
freedom of movement and would not pass the least restrictive means test.149
Finally, because this limited closure only caused a two-minute detour to
143

Id. at 208–12.
See, e.g., Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 267 n.18 (comparing the proportionality test with a German
case: “An example of the way in which the values regime is implemented in Germany, is provided by the
Mephisto case. In this case the court discussed the constitutional validity of a prohibition on the publication of
a book. The book was based on the authentic image of a deceased theatrical actor. Who had in the past
collaborated with the Nazi regime. The court examined the linkage between the conflicting values of freedom
of speech on the one hand and of the actor’s reputation on the other and ruled that a person’s reputation is
closer to the core of human dignity so that this right supersedes freedom of speech”).
145 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 224–25 [1997] (Isr.).
146 Id. at 226–27. In this case, there was not even a question of probability in determining offense to
religious feelings: “Beyond ‘near certainty,’ absolute certainty was unequivocally proven. It was proven that
the religious feelings and lifestyle of the local Ultra-Orthodox residents are in fact severely, gravely, and
seriously offended by reason of traffic going through their neighborhood on Sabbaths and festivals.” Id.
147 Id. at 227–28.
148 Id.
149 Id.
144
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motorists, the restriction against the freedom of movement survived the third
narrow proportionality test.150 The Court saw no need to judicially expand the
right to freedom of movement against the right to religious feelings because
the offense to freedom of movement was not excessive.151 Horev show that the
Court will not activate the third proportionality test and re-hash the balance
against rights when the damaged right has suffered only minimal damage.
The Court noted that the government was required to leave Bar Ilan street
open to emergency security vehicles because Bar-Ilan was a main “traffic
artery” to a major hospital.152 Even those two extra minutes of traffic time are
“crucial when it comes to saving human lives.”153 This last sentence deserves
special attention, because in later cases, the Court showed that it is willing to
sacrifice security akin to two “crucial” minutes of time necessary to save
human lives.
The following discussion of the Horev decision demonstrated some of the
main benefits of proportionality review. It showed how proportionality review
diffuses political strife by expanding the array of rights that a court will
protect. It also showed how proportionality review diffuses political strife by
transforming bitter debates about the supremacy of values into a rational
assessment of a trade-off between benefits and detriments. Finally, it
demonstrates the Court engaging in a pre-balancing evaluation of rights and
showed how that process ensures the rationality of proportionality review.
III. THE HCJ, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The HCJ confronted more highly charged topics when discussing the
human rights of Palestinians limited by Israeli security measures.154 Beginning
150

Id. at 228.
Id. at 228–29.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See, e.g., HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel PD [2004]. The
HCJ’s treatment of security/rights tradeoffs in the Israel/Palestinian conflict has stirred up extremely different
responses; see generally Robert Nicholson, Legal Intifada: Palestinian NGOs and Resistance Litigation in
Israeli Courts, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 381 (2012) (arguing that litigation brought by Palestinian
NGOs “is not just a struggle for human rights, but is in fact a campaign to use the courts to bring about regime
change inside the country . . . these Palestinian NGOs work to abolish the Jewish state in favor of a binational
“state of all its citizens.”). In contrast, “The decisions of Israel’s High Court of Justice illustrate how the
introduction of rights analysis into the context of occupation abstracts and extrapolates from this context,
placing both occupiers and occupied on a purportedly equal plane. This move upsets the built-in balance of
international humanitarian law (IHL), which ensures special protection to people living under occupation, and
widens the justification for limiting their rights beyond the scope of a strict interpretation of IHL.” Aeyal M.
151
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as early as 1982 and continuing until today, the HCJ has heard a growing
caseload brought by NGOs claiming that military security action taken by the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and other actions by Israel’s government have
violated Palestinian human rights,155 including home demolitions,156 forced
movement,157 restriction on the freedom of movement,158 access to land,159
torture and inhumane prison conditions,160 and targeted killings.161 In these
cases, the ease of bringing a case (justicability)162 despite the political and
military implications of the holdings,163 the ease of standing, and the sheer
volume of cases heard by the HCJ demand attention. In a fairly recent case, the
HCJ listed such judgments dealing with military and national security issues in
the “thousands.”164
According to the majority opinion in the Beit Sourik case, “the principle of
proportionality as a standard restricting the power of the military commander is
a common thread running through [HCJ] case law.”165 However, the HCJ has
not always employed consistent methods of evaluating rights before the
balancing process. In some cases, the Court will evaluate the importance of
Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the International Law of
Occupation? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); see also Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The
Israeli Legal System’s Failure to Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories, IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35
(2001); Michael Sfard, The Price of Internal Legal Opposition to Human Rights Abuses, 1 J. HUM. RIGHTS
PRAC. 1, 37, 39 (2009) (“[T]he Israeli Court’s jurisprudence has systematically enhanced the power and
authority of the Israeli Army and approved a wide range of abuses of the rights of the occupied population.”).
155 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense [2007] (Isr.).
156 See, e.g., HCJ 358/88 Ass’n for Civ. Rights v. C.D. Commander 43(2) PD 529 [1989] (Isr.).
157 HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank 56(6) PD 352 [2002] (Isr.).
158 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD [2007] (Isr.).
159 HCJ 9593/04 Rashed Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria, 2 PD 56 [2004] (Isr.).
160 Text of Supreme Court Decision on GSS Practices, JewishVirtualLibrary.org (Sept. 6, 1999),
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120419T094118-GSS%20practices%20-%20Judgment%20-%206-91999%20-%20Supreme%20Court%20Israel.pdf.
161 HCJ 769/02 The Public Comm. against Torture in Isr. v. Gov. of Isr. 459 PD [2002] (Isr.).
162 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 477 (2005) (stating that when the
decisions or acts of the military commander impinge upon human rights, they are “justiceable.”).
163 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. against Torture in Isr. v. Isr. 459 PD 511 [1994] (Isr.).
164 Id. at 511 (“Thousands of judgments have been given by the Supreme Court, which, in the absence of
any other adjudicative instance, has addressed these issues.”) Of further note, as the HCJ heard these cases,
their deference toward the government and military decreased steadily; see Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman,
Prolonged Armed Conflict and Deference to the Military: Lessons from Israel, supra note 151 (finding that a
“gradual but dramatic decline in the deference accorded to the military commander by the [Israeli] Supreme
Court” based on the “continuation of the armed conflict and its aftermath, namely, the routinization and
increase in the number of petitions by the civilian population.”).
165 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Isr. [2004] (“Indeed, the principle of proportionality as a standard restricting the power of the military commander is a common thread running through
our case law.”).
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rights before balancing them against one another.166 In other cases, the Court
does not enter this discussion.167
A. Basis in International Law
In general, the HCJ has applied the proportionality standard to questions of
balancing security interests and human rights relating to Israel’s occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza by drawing on international law sources.168
Particularly, the Court has relied on the Fourth Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907).169 The Court derived this
proportionality test from Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land of 1907, which obliges the occupying State to
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety;170 and Article 27 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that “Protected persons are entitled,
in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family
rights, their religious convictions and practices,” but that “the Parties to the
conflict [where one State occupies another] may take such measures of control
and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of
the war.”171 The HCJ has interpreted Article 27, which allows occupying
military forces to limit rights for the sake of security “as may be necessary,” to
allow a proportionality analysis of such military actions to ensure that they are
166

See HCJ 1890/03 Municipality of Bethlehem v. State of Israel 1–2 PD [2005].
See HCJ 10356/02 Hess v. IDF Commander in West Bank 53 PD 60 [2004].
168 HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Minister of Defence (2) IsrLR 352, 370–75 [2006] (citing Judith Gardam,
Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391 (1993)); Judith Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 285 (1996); Olivera Medenica,
Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329 (2001); Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on Terror, 32 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 1999 (2002), J. S. Pictet, Developments and Principles of International Humanitarian Law 62 (1985).
William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 94
(1982) (“[T]here is a requirement for a subordinate rule to perform the balancing function between military
and humanitarian requirements. This rule is the rule of proportionality.”). HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human
Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, 58(5) PD 385, 391 (“Israel is not an isolated island. It is a
member of an international system’. . . . The combat activities of the IDF are not conducted in a legal void.
There are legal norms—some from customary international law, some from international law entrenched in
conventions to which Israel is party, and some in the fundamental principles of Israeli law—which determine
rules about how combat activities should be conducted.”).
169 HCJ 769/02 The Public Comm. against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 467 [2006]
(citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12,
1949).
170 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense 22 [2007] (Isr.) (citing Convention (IV) respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907).
171 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 169.
167
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“necessary.”172 The strict reading of the text allows the occupying power to
take measures “necessary” to promote security and control; however, the HCJ
has interpreted Article 27 to allow limitations of rights of protected persons as
“necessary” measure for control and security to protect not only protected
persons, but also to protect Israelis, even those living illegally in the West
Bank.173
B. Deference to the Military
To “ensure, as far as possible,” the human rights of Palestinians, the Court
employs the three-prong proportionality test described above: finding a rational
connection between the security measure and its goal, ensuring that the
military commander employed the least restrictive means to achieve that goal,
and reducing that measure’s scope if the restricted right can be greatly
improved while only minimally decreasing the military’s goal. The military
has the burden to prove these tests have been satisfied.174 However, the
proportionality of the measure is examined in relation to the purpose that the
military commander is trying to achieve;175 and “when the decision of the
military commander relies upon military knowledge, the Court grants special
weight to the military expertise of the commander of the area.”176 Deference to
172

HCJ 769/02 The Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (2) IsrLR 467, 484

[2006].
173

HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, 14 [2005] (Isr.). (“The authority
to construct a security fence for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of Israeli settlers is derived from
the need to preserve public order and safety (regulation 43 of The Hague Regulations). It is called for, in light
of the human dignity of every human individual. It is intended to preserve the life of every person created in
God’s image. The life of a person who is in the area illegally is not up for the taking. Even if a person is located in the area illegally, he is not outlawed.”). See also HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD
22–23 [2007] (Isr.) (“The duty of safeguarding “public order and safety” by virtue of art. 43 of the Hague
Regulations is broad. It does not apply only to those individuals who are considered “protected persons”, but
rather, to the entire population within the bounds of the Area at any given time, including residents of the Israeli settlements and Israeli civilians who do not reside within a territory under belligerent occupation (citing
HCJ 10356/02 Hess v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] PD 58 (3) 443, 455).
174 HCJ 9593/04 Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (2) IsrLR 56, 72 [2006] (Isr.).
175 See id.
176 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, 23 (2005) (Isr.); see also HCJ
2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 14 [2004] (“The military commander is the
expert regarding the military quality of the separation fence route. We are experts regarding its humanitarian
aspects. The military commander determines where, on hill and plain, the separation fence will be erected.
That is his expertise. We examine whether this route’s harm to the local residents is proportionate. That is our
expertise”); “The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, reviews the legality of the military
commander’s discretion. Our point of departure is that the military commander, and those who obey his orders,
are civil servants holding public positions. In exercising judicial review, we do not turn ourselves into experts
in security affairs. We do not substitute the security considerations of the military commander with our own
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the military flows partly from the Court’s acute awareness of the actual
security situation involved in the decisions. As Justice Barak stated in the Beit
Sourik case:
We are members of Israeli society. Although we are sometimes in an
ivory tower, that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not infrequently hit by ruthless terror. We are aware of the killing and destruction wrought by the terror against the state and its citizens. As
any other Israelis, we too recognize the need to defend the country
and its citizens against the wounds inflicted by terror.177

While the Court affords deference to the military’s expertise and knowledge,
this deference usually only affects the first proportionality test of finding a
rational connection.178 The Court defers to the military that it has the
knowledge and experience to know when a certain measure is rationally
required to achieve a certain goal.
Despite this deference in the first stage of analysis, the Court sometimes
does not give any added deference to the military for the second or third tests,
as the cases below illustrate.179 This decision speaks partly to the Court’s
desire to ensure that the rule of law and individual liberty take equal priority
with security concerns.180 However, by not even considering added deference
security considerations. We take no position regarding the way security affairs are run. Our task is to guard the
borders and to maintain the boundaries of the military commander’s discretion . . . It is true, that the security of
the state is not a “magic word” which makes judicial review disappear. Thus, we shall not be deterred from
reviewing the decisions of the military commander . . . simply because of the important security considerations
anchoring his decision. However, we shall not substitute the discretion of the commander with our own discretion. We shall check the legality of the discretion of the military commander and ensure that his decisions fall
within the ‘zone of reasonableness.”). Id. at 27.
177 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 44 [2004] (Isr.).
178 See HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 30 [2007] (Isr.) (“This Court does not serve
as a ‘supreme military commander’, and does not substitute its own discretion for that of the military commander; it merely examines the legality of his actions. The responsibility and the authority were conferred
upon the military commander, and the court does not set itself up as an expert on matters of security in his
stead”); see also HCJ 1890/03 Municipality of Bethlehem v. State of Israel, supra note 169, at 40) (“There are
often several ways of realizing the purpose, all of them proportionate and reasonable. The military commander
is given the authority to choose between these methods, and as long as the military commander does not depart
from the ‘margin of proportionality’ and the ‘margin of reasonableness’, the Court will not intervene in his
discretion.”).
179 See, e.g., HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 58(3) PD 73 [2004] (Isr.). (declining
to evaluate the relative importance of archeological property or the value of human life and security); HCJ
2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel supra note 1 (the Court did not evaluate the
importance of freedom of movement, access to property, and communal development versus the value of human life and security).
180 For instance, in HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Minister of Defence 36–37 [1999]
(Isr.) the Court stated: “A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a de-
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to military goals, the Court declines to investigate—in a general and objective
fashion—the relative importance of security and other liberties.181 The Court
thereby compromises the rationality of its decision making,182 as the discussion
below will illustrate.
1. Haas
In Haas, the HCJ upheld the military commander’s decision to take and
demolish certain abandoned buildings of cultural and archeological value
owned by West Bank Palestinians in order to clear a security road for
worshippers walking to the Ma’arat HaMachpeleh (Cave of the Patriarchs).183
According to the opinion, large numbers of pedestrians visited this cave on the
Jewish Sabbaths and festivals, while murderous attacks on these worshippers
and security personnel had been committed in recent years by terrorist
groups.184 At the time, further terrorist attacks constituted a likely and deadly
threat.185 The commander sought to increase security by widening the road to
allow security and rescue vehicles to pass alongside the worshippers.186 The
commander’s request came on the heels of a recent terrorist attack on security
forces and worshippers travelling the narrow path, which resulted in the death
of twelve security personnel.187

mocracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components
in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to
overcome its difficulties.”
181 Cf. HCJ. 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. PD 59 [1997] (Isr.) (evaluating the relative importance
of religious feelings and freedom of movement).
182 HCJ 5016/96 HCJ. 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. PD 206 [1997] (Isr.) (holding that the rationality of a proportionality decision requires a pre-balance weighing of the relative value of rights).
183 HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 58(3) PD 60–62 [2004] (Isr.). For a description
of the Cave of the Patriarchs, see The Cave of Machpelah Tomb of the Patriarchs,
JEWISHVIRTUALLIBRARY.ORG, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/machpelah.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2014).
184 HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 56 [2004] (Isr.).
185 Id. at 59 (“In the original response of the State to the petitions, it was argued that the sole purpose of
the requisition order was security-oriented, and it did not serve as a disguise for achieving any other purpose. It
was made in direct response to the continuing risk of terrorist acts, which consistently threatened the Jewish
inhabitants who used the worshippers’ route, and in view of the responsibility of the IDF commander to ensure
their safety.”).
186 Id. at 56.
187 Id. at 57.
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a. First Proportionality Test: Rational Connection
Soon after the order to widen the road, the petitioners brought a complaint
that protested the order because, among other reasons, archeologically
important buildings from the Mamluk period and other houses intended for
conservation would be destroyed in order to widen the road.188 The petitioners
also argued that Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the
destruction of property unless this action is essential and required for military
operations.189 The respondents asserted that Article 23(g) of the Hague
Convention allows the occupying power “to destroy or seize the enemy’s
property, [only if] such destruction or seizure [is] imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war,” and that Article 52 of the Hague Convention allows
land to be requisitioned to ensure order and public security even when there is
no combat.190
The Court held that the military commander’s request passed
proportionality review.191 The order passed the first test of a rational
connection, mainly because the military commander enjoyed a presumption
that his purposes did not aim at any ulterior motive.192 Given the “bitter
experience[s]” of multiple and recent attacks on the worshippers, the Court
determined that widening the path related only to increasing security for the
worshippers using the route.193 The worshippers’ (and security officers’)
genuine vulnerability, based on the topographic characteristics of the route,
further proved the measure was strictly security-based.194 The Court
emphasized that the commander had the right and duty to protect the lives of
the worshippers and security officers, even if they were present at that site in
contradiction to international law.195 More controversially, the Court held that
188 Id. at 58. See generally James Waterson, The Mamluks, HISTORYTODAY.COM, http://www.
historytoday.com/james-waterson/mamluks (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
189 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
190 Hass, PD 58 at 70 (quoting Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties and Neutral Powers and Persons During War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 52).
191 Id. at 60.
192 Id. at 68.
193 Id. at 69.
194 Id. at 69.
195 Id. at 70.

In addition to the responsibility of the area commander to ensure the security of the military force
that he commands, he must ensure the safety, security and welfare of the inhabitants of the area.
He owes this duty to all the inhabitants, without any distinction as to their identity—Jews, Arabs
or foreigners. The question whether the residency of various parts of the population is legal does
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the military commander also had the right and duty to protect the worshippers’
fundamental freedom of worship, even if such protection limited the property
rights of the petitioners, who were protected persons.196 Scholars have
criticized this logic and argued that international law only provides that the
military commander shall protect the human rights of protected persons and
not persons of the occupying State.197
The HCJ first found that the respondents had the right to freedom of
worship. As such freedom constitutes “one of the basic human rights . . .
related to the realization of individuality” and “a constitutional right of
supreme status” as discussed in previous cases.198 Such basic right had been
codified in Israeli law under the Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967,
which guaranteed worshipers the right to visit certain holy sites without
receiving injury to religious sensibilities.199 Despite the “supreme status” of the
right to exercise religion in Israeli law, the Court cited precedent stating that
“freedom of religion and worship is not an absolute freedom [and] a balance
must be found between it and other rights and values that are worthy of
protection, including the value of private property.”200
Most notably, the Court did not discuss the right to life and security as one
of the rights claimed by the respondents. Thus, the Court did not explore
whether the respondents stood for two fundamental rights, which might have
tipped the scales toward their case before a proportionality analysis.201
not come before us today for a determination. Their very residency in the area leads to the duty of
the area commander to protect their lives and their human rights. This is part of the humanitarian
sphere for which the military force is responsible in a belligerent occupation.
HCJ 72/86 Zaloom v. IDF Commander for Judea and Samaria 41(1) PD 528 [1986] (Isr.); see also HCJ 469/83
Hebron Nat’l United Bus Co.v. Minister of Def. [1992] (Isr.); HCJ 4363/02 Zindah v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [2002] (Isr.); HCJ 4212/02 Gussin v. IDF Commander 56(4) 608 [2002] (Isr.).
196 Id. at 71.
The inhabitants of the area have a constitutional right to freedom of religion and worship. This is
the case for the Arab inhabitants and it is also the case for the Jewish inhabitants who live there.
The inhabitants of the area also have the right of freedom of movement, by means of which it is
possible to realize, inter alia, the right of access to holy places.
Id.; see also HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 19 [2005] (Isr.).
197 See generally Gross, supra note 154.
198 HCJ 10356/02 Haas v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 71 [2004] (Isr.).
199 Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727–1967, 21 LSI 76 (1966–67) (Isr.).
200 HCJ 10356/02 Haas v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 71 [2004] (Isr.).
201 But see Aeyal M. Gross, supra note 4, at 395 (“[T]he HCJ does not challenge this occupation’s basic
structure, which views the settlers’ rights as security concerns that can justify placing restrictions on the rights
of the local residents.”).
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b. Lack of Pre-Balancing Analysis and Conflating the Second and Third
Tests
The Court determined that the security measure satisfied proportionality
because the military commander reduced the security surrounding the footpath
to “only to a minimum level,” beyond which “every other alternative was far
more costly in terms of the security risks;” while at the same time the
commander “reduced to a minimum the harm to private property along the
route.”202 In these statements, the Court conflated the second and third
proportionality tests together. The Court deemed a security measure that
employed a least restrictive means as automatically satisfying the third
“narrow proportionality” test, i.e., a measure that reflected a fair trade-off
between the competing rights. However, whether the act was actually
proportional according to the third test—whether the means of increasing
human rights of the petitioners justified the decrease in security for the
respondents—is a different question from whether the military commander
employed the least restrictive means.
The Court held that the security measure was proportional in the strict
sense because it minimized damage to cultural property while ensuring “only a
minimum [but feasible level] of security measures” to protect the lives of the
worshippers.203 To create this minimum but feasible level of security, the
commander reduced the original width of part of the security route from eight
meters to six meters, which resulted in the destruction of only two and a half
uninhabited archeological buildings, rather than thirteen.204 On the other hand,
with only six meters of pathway rather than eight, the path could only handle
one-way traffic of security and rescue vehicles, rather than two-way traffic.205
The military commander and the Court recognized that the loss of bidirectional traffic would cause an increased security risk for the worshippers
and security personnel.206 At least theoretically, the military commander traded
the security, and possibly the lives, of the worshippers and security personal
for the protection of property. Nevertheless, the Court confirmed this action as
202 Id. at 78. (The opinion discusses the recent dangers posed by terrorists on worshippers and security
personnel. But nowhere in the opinion do the judges discuss the probable risk of injury or death caused by the
reduction of the security road from allowing bidirectional traffic to only allowing unidirectional traffic.).
203 Id. (The commander reduced security to the point such that “every other alternative was far more costly in terms of the security risks to the worshippers and the harm and damage anticipated to the inhabitants of
the area.”).
204 Id. at 61. The property owners of the two and half buildings received just compensation.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 61.
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proportional in the strict sense even though it only found that the least
restrictive means had been employed.207
Because it found an apparently proportional outcome, the Court declined to
perform a pre-balance weighing of the rights.208 As the Court stated, “in view
of the facts of the concrete case, the balance between them satisfie[d]”
proportionality; therefore there was no need to adopt a decisive position with
regard to the relative value of the conflicting rights.209 However, had the Court
evaluated the relative importance of the rights in question before balancing
them, the Court might have determined that a proportional result in the strict
sense had not been achieved.
3. A Lack of Rationality
Because the Court declined to weigh the conflicting rights before balancing
them, its decision in Haas conflicts with prior HCJ precedent210 and lacks
rationality.211 As discussed above, the Court never examined the importance of
protecting uninhabited archeological property as compared to the right of
worship, let alone the right of security and bodily integrity, before proceeding
with a proportionality analysis. Another flaw in the Court’s reasoning is that
the Court did not analyze the right to life and security as a right that should
limit the protection of cultural property.212 Security and the right to life did not
serve as added rights for the side of the respondents that would weigh against
the rights of the petitioners.213 The Court did not examine the actual nature of
the security need for bi-directional traffic of security vehicles.

207

See id. at 78.
Id. at 77.
209 Id.
210 See supra Parts II.B. and II.C.; see infra notes 211, 212.
211 Horev, PD at 198 (holding that a standard for judging between different rights in general, based on
their social value, must be found before commencing a particular judicial balancing consideration). Here, the
Court did discuss the importance of the different rights in isolation from each other.
212 Hass, PD at 75–77.
213 Id. at 77. (The Court only looked at security as a consideration that might prevent the military commander from even allowing the worshippers to visit the Cave of the Patriarchs. This question of balancing security against whether the worshippers should even earn protection from the government constituted the “first
stage” of the balancing process. Only after the Court determined that the right to worship at the Cave of
Machpeleh outweighed fundamental safety concerns did the Court proceed to weigh the petitioners’ protection
of cultural property against the respondents’ right to worship.).
208
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The Court in Haas skipped over a principle it stated in an earlier case,
Sabih v. Commander of IDF forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria, which
explored a similar trade-off between security and human rights:
The different material dictates, in itself, different methods of intervention. Indeed, an act of state and an act of war do not change their
character also if the same are subject to the court’s supervision, and
the character of the acts, naturally, makes an imprint on the modes of
intervention.214

Similarly, the Court contradicted what it would state in a later case, Mara’abe
v. The Prime Minister of Israel, which involved the building of a security
fence:
The solution is not in assignment of absolute weight to one of the
considerations; the solution is in assignment of relative weights to the
various considerations, while balancing between them at the point of
decision.215

The Court gave no standard of weight or magnitude of harm for the destruction
of uninhabited property with archeological value relative to the probability of
loss of life. It thereby compromised its consistency and credibility by declaring
acts proportional without considering if the act struck a true balance based on
the relative value of the rights.216
Had the Court evaluated the relative importance of the conflicting rights, it
might have determined that enhancing protection of cultural property while
diminishing the effectiveness of a security road did not actually create a
proportional result. For instance, if the Court had found that security and the
right to life already greatly outweighed protection of cultural property in
general, then it would have required a much greater benefit in protection of
214

(Isr.).

HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria PD 369 [1996]

215 See HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 19 [2005] (Isr.) See also HCJ
501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 192 [1997] (Isr.) (“A decision’s reasonableness is assessed
by balancing between competing values, according to their respective weight.” (emphasis added)); HCJ 14/86
Laor v. The Film and Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 421, 434 [1987] (Isr.) (“[N]ot all principles are of identical
significance in society’s eyes. Thus, in the absence of legislative direction, the Court must assess the relative
social importance of the different values. Just as there is no person without a shadow, so too, there is no principle without weight. Balance on the basis of weight necessarily implies a social assessment of the relative
importance of the different principles.”).
216 See Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, Proportionality: A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the
ICON Controversy, 10 INT. J. CONST. L. 687, 692 (2012) (“It is true that balancing cannot do without moral
reasoning. Only a very naïve approach would arrive at the conclusion that any legal reasoning could be valuefree and deprived of any moral considerations.”).
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cultural property to balance against any detriment to security and the right to
life. Alternatively, it may have determined that no benefit to the protection of
cultural property could ever justify any decrease in the right to life and
security.217 Or, it may have found that the security risk created by reducing the
security road to unidirectional traffic was only minimal and that the only
benefit reduced was mere psychological comfort; and therefore sacrificing two
and a half buildings for psychological comfort was proportionate (or
disproportionate).
That the Court did not perform a closer analysis to determine a different
outcome is understandable for two reasons. First, the Court’s only task in this
case was to determine whether the military commander broke the law by
destroying the two and a half pieces of cultural property. The Court was not
required to analyze the case in greater detail to determine a better plan of
action for the military commander. Second, the Court showed legitimate
deference to the military commander, and did not have the authority question
his judgment as long as he stayed within the bounds of the law.218 The Court
judges cases on the principle that “when the decision of the military
commander relies upon military knowledge, the Court grants special weight to
the military expertise of the commander of the area.”219 However, it would
have been interesting and perhaps preferable had the Court further analyzed the
case (perhaps in a dicta portion of the opinion) to determine whether the final
result fit with the Court’s prior definition of a “proportional trade-off.”220 Was
the Court being as precise as it could have when it described destroying only
two and a half pieces of cultural property, rather than thirteen, and thereby only

217 See e.g., HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. IsrLR 153, 193 [1997] (“[T]here are some interests
against which there can be no balancing. For example, when the State of Israel’s very existence was placed on
the scales, this Court refused to weigh between that interest and competing interests.”).
218 See HCJ 7979/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 1, 18 [2005] (Isr.).
219 Id. at 23 (citing HCJ 390/79 Duikat v. The Gov’t of Isr. 34(1) PD 1, 25 [1979] (Isr.); HCJ 258/79
Amira v. Minister of Def. 34(1) PD 90, 92 [1979] (Isr.); HCJ 1005/89 Aga v. Commander of the IDF Forces in
the Gaza Strip Area 44(1) PD 536, 539 [1990] (Isr.)). Perhaps the Court in Haas was working on the unspoken
assumption that the commander’s security order fell within the “of reasonableness” established by prior HCJ
decisions. According to the “zone of reasonableness” concept, judges admit that weighing conflicting values is
not an exact science, and that different alternative balances could all fall within a zone of reasonableness. A
judge overrules a government’s decision only when the measure taken by the government or commander fell
outside of this zone; see Horev, PD at 381.
220 This would not have been the first time that the Court would re-analyze or re-frame its holding. For
instance, in Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense the Court entered into a proportionality analysis of the military
commander’s decision, despite overturning his order for a different reason. HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Def. 1–2 [2008] (Isr.).
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building a single lane security road, rather than a two-way security road, as
actually proportionate?
Even though the Court was not required to further analyze the case to
determine a different holding, perhaps it should have used this analysis to
avoid deeming a possibly disproportionate result as proportionate. Indeed, as
the Court stated in Horev, “[B]alancing ought to be based on a generalization
that also allows for the resolution of future cases . . . a rational principle ought
to be formulated.”221 Because the Court did not do a pre balancing evaluation
of the rights, it declined to help resolve future cases that would grapple with
similar issues.222 By declining to perform such an evaluation, perhaps the
Court in this case began to establish or strengthen a trend of deeming results
proportionate without actually analyzing the genuine proportionality of those
results. It thus weakened its own credibility by declaring an act as
proportionate more from a stance of conviction and less from a rational
measurement of the trade-off between benefits and detriments.223
2. Beit Sourik
In Beit Sourik, the HCJ ruled on the legality of the controversial224 security
fence built by the Israeli government and the Minister’s Committee on
National Security225 in response to a wave of terror attacks in the early part of
the last decade.226 The government and the Minister’s Committee intended to
build the fence to hold back the wave of attacks.227 For each intended portion
of the fence under scrutiny, the Court confirmed that security was the only
objective, and that there were no ulterior motives inherent in these portions of

221

Horev, PD at 196.
HCJ 10356/02 Haas v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 77 [2004] (Isr.).
223 Cf. The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1979).
224 See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 3–4 [2004] (Isr.).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1. (“In September 2000, the Palestinian side began a campaign of terror against Israel and Israelis. Terror attacks take place both in the area and in Israel. They are directed against citizens and soldiers, men
and women, elderly and infants, regular citizens and public figures. Terror attacks are carried out everywhere:
in public transportation, in shopping centers and markets, in coffee houses and in restaurants. Terror organizations use gunfire attacks, suicide attacks, mortar fire, Katyusha rocket fire, and car bombs. From September
2000 until the beginning of April 2004, more than 780 attacks were carried out within Israel. During the same
period, more than 8200 attacks were carried out in the area. The armed conflict claimed (as of April 2004) the
lives of 900 Israeli citizens and residents. More than 6000 were injured, some with serious wounds that have
left them severely handicapped. The armed conflict has left many dead and wounded on the Palestinian side as
well. Bereavement and pain wash over us.”).
227 Id. at 3–4.
222
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the fence, such as land grabs.228 Thus, each intended section under scrutiny
passed the first proportionality test: finding a rational connection between the
military’s stated objectives and the means of achieving those objectives.229
The Court then analyzed four different sections of the proposed fence that
the petitioners claimed disproportionately injured their rights.230 In each
instance, the military commander sought to move the fence farther from Israeli
villages and closer to Palestinian villages.231 This placement would achieve
two basic security goals: allowing more of a vantage point over Palestinian
villages and weak points in the fence, and creating a buffer between the fence
and Israeli villages, such that the IDF would have more time to respond and
catch a terrorist breaching the fence.232 If the fence were built closer to the
Israeli villages, these two advantages would be lost.233 Yet, the petitioners
sought to scale the fence back, closer to the Israeli villages.234 The petitioners
wished to move the fence away from their towns to prevent their villagers from
being separated from important land and buildings.235
a. Declining to Consider the Claims on Their Own Terms
As in Haas, the Court declined to compare the conflicting rights to each
other before commencing a proportionality review.236 In many ways, the
oversights of the Court in Beit Sourik are more apparent. First, the Court does
not clearly define the security rights at issue. The Court did not discuss the
actual threat to life and security that each section of the fence was built to
prevent.
On the other hand, it clearly defined the injuries to the petitioners. For
instance, in analyzing the first section of the fence, the Court claimed that this
section of fence would severely impair the free movement and property rights
228

See generally id. at 32, 38–39, 41.
Id.
230 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 3–4 [2004] (Isr.).
231 Id.
232 See generally id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 33–34 [2004] (Isr.). In paragraph 57, the
Court begins a proportionality analysis of the first section of the fence under review. Until paragraph 59, which
employs a narrow proportionality review (whether the goal could be slightly reduced while greatly mitigating
damage to the restricted party), the Court did not discuss any standard by which the rights of the petitioners—
free access to important land and buildings—should be weighed against security and the right to life.
229
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of 13,000 farmers by cutting them off from thousands of acres of farmland and
thousands of productive trees, and by setting up a license system for access,
which would allow access to these lands from only two points in the fence, and
only at specific times of day.237 This situation would create long lines for the
farmers to access their farms, would make vehicle access to the farms difficult,
would create distance between the farmers and their farms, as there would only
be two entrances by which to access the farms: all of these restrictions
together, according to the Court, would stifle development and change the
farmer’s lives completely, and thus constituted severe impairments on free
movement and property rights for thousands of people.238
On the other hand, according to the Court, moving the fence closer to the
Israeli villages would only create a “minute difference” in security.239
However, this difference in security is “minute,” according to the Court, only
in comparison to the injury to the petitioners:
The gap between the security provided by the military commander’s
approach and the security provided by the alternate route is minute,
as compared to the large difference between a fence that separates
the local inhabitants from their lands, and a fence which does not
separate the two (or which creates a separation which is smaller and
possible to live with).240

Like in Haas, the Court here does not evaluate the competing rights before
balancing them. The Court does not attempt to consider the reduction in
security on its own terms. It does not determine if moving the fence closer to
the Israeli villages would result in certain death, or how many deaths, or near
certain death or injury, or how many injuries. What might be a major loss of
security in general terms is reduced to a “minute difference” only after a
comparison with the damage to the petitioner’s rights. Thus the Court does not
determine exactly what goal the respondents claimed. The analysis of the other
three portions of the fence contained this same pattern.241
237

Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 38–39.
239 Id. at 35.
240 Id. (emphasis added).
241 Id. at 38. “The difficulties we mentioned regarding the previous order apply here as well. As we have
seen, it is possible to lessen this damage substantially if the route of the separation fence passing east and west
of Har Adar is changed, reducing the area of agricultural lands lying beyond the fence. The security advantage
(in comparison to the possible alternate route) which the military commander wishes to achieve is not proportionate to the severe injury to the farmers (according to the route proposed by the military commander) (emphasis added)”; id. at 39–40 (“We are convinced that the security advantage achieved by the route, as determined by the military commander, in comparison with the alternate route, is in no way proportionate to the
238
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Even less does the Court discuss the relative of importance of the
petitioners’ and the respondents’ rights.242 The Court does not assign relative
weights to the competing interests before balancing them together, contrary to
established case precedent that would require this analysis.243 Possibly, the
Court had no qualms about employing this less disciplined proportionality
review because of decisions like Haas that previously had declined to evaluate
the weight of the competing rights before balancing.
b. Implications
Theoretically it is possible that the Court in Beit Sourik ruled for the
proportionate result. Perhaps the reduction in security for all four parts of the
fence was actually minimal. And perhaps that minimal reduction in security
balanced fairly against the increase in human rights for the petitioners.
Unfortunately, the public will not know whether a proportionate result was
actually achieved, because the Court does not depict the security that was
sacrificed. Nor does it depict how lost security—on its own terms—compares
to the human rights of the petitioners.
Thus, the decision, as well as the Haas decision, does not actualize one of
the main benefits of proportionality review discussed earlier in the comment,
that of diffusing political strife through rational decision-making. As discussed
earlier, the Court in a proportionality review is involved in “balancing between
conflicting interests and values.”244 Necessarily, then, the Court is involved in

additional injury to the lives of the local inhabitants caused by this order.” (emphasis added)); id. at 41–43
(putting forth a similar analysis with no discussion of the nature of the competing rights or their values considered independently of one another.).
242 Cf. HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. Israel PD 1, 27–28 [2005] (Isr.) (“In the case before us,
we are presented with a conflict between two basic rights of equal weight . . . . [B]oth the freedom of worship
and the freedom of movement have been recognized in our case law as being on the highest level of the scale
of rights . . . . In addition, with regard to both of them an identical balancing formula has been applied in order
to balance them against the same public interests . . . . The result implied by the conclusion that we are concerned with a conflict between two rights of equal weight is that the balance required in this case is a horizontal balance, which will allow the coexistence of both of these rights.”).
243 Cf. HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria PD, 369 [1996]
(Isr.) (emphasis added). (“Different subjects require different methods of intervention. Indeed, acts of state and
acts of war do not change their character just because they are subject to the review of the judiciary, and the
character of the acts, according to the nature of things, imprints its mark on the methods of intervention.”);
HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 21 [2005] (Isr.) (citations omitted) (“The
solution is not to assign absolute weight to one of the considerations; the solution is to assign relative weights
to the various considerations, while balancing between them at the point of decision[.]”).
244 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 193 [1997] (Isr.).
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“placing competing values on the scale”245 and determining whether a
reduction in certain benefits weighs equally—within a zone of
reasonableness246—with a corresponding increase in liberties and rights. In
order for this balancing process to make sense, the Court must know the
weight of the values it places on the scale. Furthermore, it can only determine
the weight of these values relative to each other. As the Court stated: “balance
on the basis of weight necessarily implies a social assessment [i.e. a weighing]
of the relative importance of the different principles” before the balancing
process.247 A social value, such as freedom of movement, does not have
absolute weight: “[t]he weight of any social principle is relative. The status of
any fundamental principle is always assessed in relation to that of other
principles with which it is likely to conflict.”248 The public was given no way
to understand why certain security measures should be limited by other human
rights because the Court did not explain why promoting those human rights
should limit security and the right to life in principle.249
By declining to weigh the values against each other before balancing in
order to determine which weights would actually go “on the scale,” the Court
in Beit Sourik did not conclusively determine the best trade-off between
governmental goals and human rights. Therefore, the decision does not diffuse
political strife, because the public will not know if the Court determined a
rational, proportional trade-off that objectively “weighs the costs against the
benefits.”250

245

Id. (citing HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’Am Company Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, PD 7, 871, 879 [1953]
(Isr.)). (“This was the Court’s approach regarding the conflict between freedom of expression and preserving
public peace . . . in the clash between freedom of movement and public security[.]”)(internal citations omitted).
246 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’be v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 10 [2005] (Isr.).
247 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v.
The Film and Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 421, 434 [1987]).
248 Id. at 192 (citing CA 105/92 Re’em Eng’rs and Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth,
47(5) PD 189 [1993]).
249 Cf. The Margin of Appreciation, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/
lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/Paper2_en.asp (“The right to life cannot be balanced either against other rights or
against the lawful pursuit of law enforcement goals, because it is strongly prioritized by the “absolute necessity” test . . . . Balancing the rights protected by this article against other rights or against any public interest is
therefore not appropriate.”).
250 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 34 [2004] (Isr.).
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3. Abu Safiyeh
One of the most recent decisions where the HCJ balanced security against
human rights is Abu Safiyeh v. The Minister of Defense.251 In this case, the
military commander issued an order prohibiting all Palestinians living in the
West Bank from accessing Route 443 without a travel permit.252 Road 443
constituted one of the main traffic arteries connecting the West Bank to
Israel.253 This travel order carried a long list of detriments for the petitioners:
they were forced to travel through an alternative route that is winding, narrow,
and in disrepair, thereby lengthening necessary travel time and cost; moreover,
the travel order cut off access to the city of Ramallah, which caused the closing
of businesses, cut off access to educational, emergency, and medical facilities,
and harmed social relationships; and finally, the order prevented direct access
to the petitioners’ farming lands, and also transferred traffic congestion on to
internal roads, which had led to an increase in traffic accidents.254
The respondents argued that the travel order was necessary for the security
of Israelis travelling on the road and that it was a temporary order issued only
in response to a series of “brutal and murderous terrorist attacks . . . .”255 The
order was intended to reduce the likely recurrence of former terror incidents
including a car bombing, a drive-by shooting followed by an escape to a
nearby village, the kidnapping of Israelis travelling on the road, and the
transportation of terrorists and weapons into the territory of the State of
Israel.256 The respondents cited a marked decrease in terror incidents after the
issuance of the travel order, as well as a continuing threat of terror attacks
necessitating the travel order.257 Respondents also claimed that the petitioners
exaggerated their claims because the alternative route provided “a reasonable
connection among the villages themselves and between the villages and the
city of Ramallah,” and also because the Israeli government was then spending
the equivalent of millions of dollars to construct “fabric of life roads” that
would provide a better option than the current alternative route, thus providing
a reasonable alternative to travel along Route 443.258 Thus, respondents
251

HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 1, 46 [2007] (Isr.).
Id. at 9.
253 Id. at 6.
254 Id. at 9.
255 Id. at 11.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 11–12. Respondents cited fifty-eight recent incidents where Palestinians threw stones or incendiary devices at Israeli cars travelling on the road.
258 Id. at 12.
252
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characterized that the case was a conflict between “inconvenience and [the]
right to life and physical safety[,]” and therefore that the Court should not even
consider a proportionality review of the issue.259
The Court entered that proportionality review and found that the restrictive
travel order satisfied the rational connection test.260 The Court found that the
restriction was “extremely prejudicial,” at first, and implicitly agreed with the
petitioners that it included not only a restriction on the freedom of movement
but also on additional rights, “including the right to earn a living and to live
with dignity, the right to education and to maintain contact with family
members, and the right to health and to receive medical treatment.”261
However, the Court found that the opening of the Beit Ur–Beituniya “fabric of
life” road “led to a real reduction of the damage to the quality of the
Palestinian residents’ lives[,]” and that although the road “[i]ndisputably . . . is
not a fast highway like Road 443, but a two-lane road of lower quality[,]” it
nevertheless “appears to be capable of providing the residents of the villages
with direct access to the regional city.”262
Despite the fact that the fabric of life road had reduced almost all
detriments to the petitioners—the Court implied that the “the inconvenience
caused to the petitioners by the travel restrictions applying to them represents
an indirect and limited infringement of their rights[]”—the Court nevertheless
ruled the travel order disproportionate.263 The Court’s reasoning was as
follows: The Israeli government had originally built Route 443 for the benefit
of the petitioners and all West Bank Palestinians, and it had done so by
expropriating their land, and in time, Israelis would use the road as a main
traffic artery to access the West Bank.264 After the travel order excluding
Palestinians from Route 443 was issued, there began to be a “complete
exclusion of the residents of the Area from a road that was intended to serve

259 Id. at 15. See also HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 193 [1997] (Isr.) (“[T]here
are some interests against which there can be no balancing. For example, when the State of Israel’s very existence was placed on the scales, this Court refused to weigh between that interest and competing interests.” (citing IA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee 19(3) PD 373, 373 [1965] (Isr.))).
260 HCJ 2150/70 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 1, 33 [2008] (Isr.).
261 Id. at 37.
262 Id. at 39.
263 Abu Safiyeh, PD at 39, 40 (quoting HCJ 6379/07 Comm. of the Dolev Settlement v. IDF Commander
in the Judaea and Samaria Area [2008] (Isr.)).
264 Id. at 12, 17.
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them, in favor of Israeli traffic that runs primarily between the coastal plain
and Jerusalem.”265 Therefore, the Chief Justice stated:
As I see it, under those circumstances, the indiscriminate ban on travel that was imposed upon the Palestinian residents of the Area does
not fulfill the third sub-test of proportionality. This is because sufficient weight was not ascribed to preserving the rights of those residents as “protected persons.”266

Essentially, the Chief Justice tilted the scales toward the petitioners because
their rights as protected persons had been breached by the travel order.
According to Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land of 1907, appended to the Fourth Hague Convention, an
occupying state is obligated to “ensure, as far as possible, public security and
safety” of occupied peoples (which the Court uses interchangeably with the
term “protected persons”).267 When the military expropriated land from
protected persons,268 and then later determined that the land could only be used
by the occupying power, it thereby breached its international law obligations to
those protected persons.269
In this case, the Court was transparent about which factors would add
weight to each of the parties’ claims. The Court showed that as it analyzed the
proportionality of the measure, it would add weight to the petitioners’ claims
because the military infringed upon their rights as protected persons. Thus the
Court assessed the weight of the rights in question before balancing them. This
assessment of the weight of rights is necessary in a proportionality review,
because, as mentioned, “[b]alance on the basis of weight necessarily implies a
social assessment [i.e. a weighing] of the relative importance of the different
principles” before the balancing process.270
However, the Court gave no explanation—based on precedent271 or any
other reasons—of the relative importance of the right to life and security and
the petitioners’ rights under international law as protected persons. As

265

Id. at 40.
Id. (emphasis added).
267 Id. (quoting Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex I art.
43, 36 Stat. 2227, U.N.T.S. 539).
268 Id. at 2, 17.
269 Id. at 29.
270 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v.
Film and Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 421, 434 [1987] (Isr.)).
271 See supra Parts II.B. and II.C.; see notes 211–212.
266

KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/22/2015 12:26 PM

ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

631

mentioned, a pre-balance weighing of rights alone is not sufficient for a proper
proportionality review. The Court stated that it must determine and justify the
relative importance of the rights at issue:
A social value . . . does not have “absolute weight.” The weight of
any social principle is relative. The status of any fundamental principle is always assessed in relation to that of other principles with
which it is likely to conflict.272

The Court offered no explanation of the relative importance of the petitioners’
rights as protected persons and the respondents’ fundamental right to life and
security. It did not explain why the petitioners’ rights as protected persons
should, in general, weigh significantly against the respondent’s right to life.
Thus, the Court’s conclusion that proportionality demands lifting the travel
ban is questionable. The Court did not necessarily achieve a fair and balanced
trade-off between security benefits and human rights detriments. The Court
does not explain why the petitioners’ rights as protected persons factored so
heavily in limiting the respondents’ security and right to life (especially when
the respondents’ core claim was for detriments to their freedom of movement).
Thus, the Court does not explain why the holding satisfies proportionality. As
mentioned, ruling on a certain trade-off between competing values gains more
credibility when judges are realistic, rational, and open about the relative
importance of those values. Ironically, when the Court does not explain the
relative importance of the values at issue, the decision comes out as

272 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.) (citing CA 105/92 Re’em
Eng’rs and Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth PD 47(5) 189, 205 [1993] (Isr.)).

KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

632

1/22/2015 12:26 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

“arbitrary”273 and “paternalistic”274, which is exactly what the Court was trying
to avoid by using proportionality review.275
CONCLUSION
As this Comment has shown, proportionality review offers multiple
benefits to a society employing this review. Proportionality review expands the
rights that a Court will protect, even non-fundamental rights, such as the
religious feelings found in Horev. Proportionality review allows more
politically insulated judges to take a second look at governmental decisions
that limit human rights, to determine not only whether the government unduly
limited a given right, but also whether it could have achieved its goal more
efficiently without limiting rights as severely. Furthermore, proportionality
review diffuses political strife by expanding the array of rights that a society
will protect as constitutionally guaranteed. Relatedly, proportionality review
diffuses strife by reframing political disputes as objective trade-offs between
concrete benefits and detriments, such as was the case in Horev, where
proportionality review transformed a deadlock battle between religious and
secular values into an objective trade-off between a two minute detour and
severely damaged religious feelings.
As shown, in order for proportionality review to work, especially with
regards to the third test, judges must first determine the general, relative
importance of the rights and goals at issue. Since proportionality review
requires judges to decide whether certain rights and goals should gain more or
less protection, judges must necessarily determine the relative importance of

273 See Cohen-Eliya, supra note 33, at 266; see also Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?, UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 3
(2010) (“All commentators agree that no simple formula can describe how the margin of appreciation [another
term for proportionality review] works and that, in spite of the mountain of jurisprudence and analysis, its most
striking characteristic remains its casuistic, uneven, and largely unpredictable nature.”).
274 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 196 [1997] (Isr.) (citing FH 9/77 Israel Elec. Co. v.
Ha’Aretz Newspaper Publ’ns 32(3) PD 337, 361 [1978] (Isr.)). See Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot,
NEW REPUBLIC, at 6–7 (Apr. 23, 2007) (calling Barak a “legal buccaneer” and “enlightened despot”). See also
Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy and the Fight Against Terrorism, 35 H.K. L.J.
287, 287–89 (2005) (“[O]ne of the lessons of the Holocaust and of the Second World War is the need to have
democratic constitutions and ensure that they are put into effect by supreme court judges whose main task is to
protect democracy . . . the main role of the supreme court judge in a democracy is to maintain and protect the
constitution and democracy . . . . Judicial protection of democracy in general and of human rights in particular
characterises the development of most modern democracies.). Here, the former Chief Justice implies that in
modern society, the judicial branch is the superior organ charged with preserving democracy.
275 Cohen-Eliya, supra note 22, at 266.
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those rights in the overall scheme of constitutional values.276 (Deciding
whether the right to life should limit the right to speed, and how much, must
depend on the relative value of these rights in the overall scheme of social
values.277)
This comment showed the Court in Horev systematically weighing the
rights at issue before beginning a proportionality review. This evaluation of the
relative weight of the values at issue ensured that the decision was based on
objective criteria, rationality, and precedent.278 On the other hand, the Court in
at least three decisions—Haas and Beit Sourik, and Abu Safiyeh—declined to
determine the relative value of the rights and goals at issue in any systematic or
rational way based on precedent. The Court’s reluctance to enter this
discussion of the relative importance of the rights at issue compromised its
holding in each case. The public was given no way to understand why certain
security measures should be limited by other human rights because the Court
did not explain why promoting those human rights should limit security and
the right to life in principle.
A look back at history might help the justices of the HCJ to determine a
better path for the future. After the Second World War, Germany began
officially using proportionality review.279 As a basis for that review, the
German Constitutional Court set up a systematic hierarchy of values, or
Wertrangordnung.280 The relative position and importance of each value would
be determined in reference to the supreme value of Germany: human
dignity.281 This hierarchy of values would provide a framework for rationally
deciding proportionality questions. Major criticism of this approach developed
in Germany.282 Critics claimed that judges have no expertise in weighing
values283 and that elected officials should bear that responsibility for the
represented public;284 they also claimed that judges would determine this
hierarchy of values arbitrarily and based on their own beliefs.285 Therefore, in

276 Id. at 267 (citing Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review and Representation, 3 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 572 (2005)).
277 Id. See HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 21 [2005] (Isr.).
278 See supra Parts II.B. and II.C.
279 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 465.
280 Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 267.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 268.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
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response to this impending “tyranny of the judges,”286 the German Court
decided that any proportionality review based on the third test—where judges
would disagree with elected officials on the proper balance between policy
goals and human liberties—could only be decided if there was a clear lack of
proportionality in the government’s decision.287 This decision flowed from the
fact that judges using proportionality would have to determine a hierarchy of
rights, and that determining this hierarchy of values inevitably involves
arbitrariness and personal belief.288
The Israeli Court could try the approach that Germany has chosen.289 In
close calls, where finding a proper balance between security and liberty turns
on the assignment of values to the conflicting rights,290 such restraint might
prevent judges from ruling based on arbitrary or unexplained preference for
one value over another (as arguably happened in the three cases discussed). Or,
the Court could implement what Iddo Porat has called the “dual model of
balancing.”291 In this model, a court would only employ the third
proportionality test when balancing two conflicting rights of the same
importance and magnitude: a conflict between a lower-order value and a
higher-order value would not occur.292 This would keep lower-order and
higher-order values separate and would prevent a judge from encroaching on a
higher-order right by arbitrarily exaggerating the importance of a lower-order
right.293
286

Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 267.
Id.
288 Id. at 268.
289 Id. at 269.
290 See Christopher Michaelsen, The Proportionality Principle, Counter-Terrorism Laws and Human
Rights, 2 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 19, 22 (2010) (“[T]he great majority of commentators on both sides of the
equation argue that in order to protect liberal democracy from the scourge of international terrorism, a ‘balance’ must be struck between security and liberty. Where this balance falls, of course, depends on the political
colours of the respective commentator.”).
291 Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in
Constitutional Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2006).
292 Id. at 1395. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 98.
293 Other scholars suggest that liberty and security should never be balanced against one another. See
Michaelsen, supra note 290, at 24 (“[A] simple balancing approach does not give adequate consideration to the
philosophical and conceptual underpinnings of the notions of liberty and security. Liberty is a precondition of,
and closely interrelated with, security. As a consequence, the two goods cannot be balanced against each other
logically. Secondly, there are major rights-based objections against a simple balancing exercise. These include
the jurisprudential problem of whether and to what extent civil liberties can be actually balanced against community interests. Other rights-based objections range from the difficulties of conceiving security as an individual right to the distributive character of the measures curtailing liberty themselves. It is not the entire population which is trading off liberty for greater security but only certain parts of it. Thirdly, commentators invoking
the balance metaphor to justify new security laws to counter the immediate dangers posed by terrorism do not
287
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This comment does not suggest that the rights and values emphasized by
the HCJ in the Haas, Beit Sourik, and Abu Safiyeh decisions were unfounded
or morally wrong. This comment only points out the decisions in those cases
turned—whether implicitly or explicitly—on the Court’s emphasis on the
importance of human rights over security values in the balancing process.
Moreover, the Court does not explain in a reasoned way, or in a way based on
precedent, why the conflicting values should have such relative weights
assigned to them. Therefore, the decisions are possibly tainted by arbitrariness
and paternalism. Moving forward, the HCJ should pay closer attention to
explaining and clarifying how it determines the relative weight of values, as it
did in previous cases such as Horev. This will allow the Court to produce
decisions in the future that fully provide all of the benefits of proportionality
review while avoiding the dangers of paternalism and arbitrariness.
MICHAEL KLEINMAN∗

give appropriate weight to the long-term consequences of curtailing fundamental rights and liberties. Despite
some possible short-term gains in security, some counter-measures may actually increase the potential for terrorism and diminish security in the long run. Finally, detailed questions have to be asked as to whether a diminution of liberty actually enhances security or whether one is trading off civil liberties for symbolic gains and
psychological comfort.”).
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